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SOCIAL PROTECTION OF 
MARGINAL PART-TIME, 
SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND 
SECONDARY JOBS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS  
 
Gijsbert Vonk, Annette Jansen 
 
PREFACE 
In many European countries, marginal part-time, (solo-) self-employment 
and secondary jobs has been increasing since the last decades. The ques-
tion about the provision of social protection and labour legislation for these 
types of employment is the starting point for a project entitled “Hybrid work-
ing arrangements in Europe”, directed by the WSI.  Germany, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Denmark and Austria comprise the group of 
countries selected in order to investigate “hybrid work” in the context of 
different welfare state regimes. The following paper by Gijsbert Vonk and 
Annette Jansen is one of the seven country studies that describe in detail 
labour law regulations and the national insurance systems for self-
employed, secondary jobs and marginal part-time employment.  
 
Karin Schulze Buschoff (WSI) 
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1 General information about social protection in the 
Netherlands  
1.1 General 
The Dutch system of labour law revolves around the employment contract, 
de arbeidsovereenkomst, regulated in Book 7 of Title 10 of the Dutch Civil 
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW). The definition ‘employment contract’ ex-
cludes self-employed workers, who are bound by other contracts regulated 
elsewhere in the Dutch Civil Code, in particular the contract for services. 
 
Since the 1980s the labour market has become increasingly flexible and 
the labour relationship more complex to qualify. Following an agreement 
between the social partners and the government, new legislation on flexicu-
rity entered into force in 1998 (Wet Flex en Zekerheid). This led, amongst 
many other things, to the inclusion of a separate contract form in the La-
bour Code, the so called agency contract. The act was to grant flexible em-
ployees a stronger position but this was only partly achieved, one of the 
reasons for this being that the newly introduced rules can be set aside on 
the basis of collective labour agreements. This resulted in new debates and 
a new agreement in 2013. This agreement culminated in the new Act on 
Work and Security (Wet Werk en Zekerheid), which entered into force on 1 
July 2015. The main aim of this act is to establish a new balance between 
employees with permanent contracts (the so-called 'insiders') and the very 
diverse group of flexworkers ('outsiders'). Solo self-employed workers are 
also considered to be among these outsiders.  
 
In June 2015, TNO Innovation for Life and Statistics Netherlands published 
an overview report on the dynamics of the Dutch labour market (in Dutch), 
with a focus on flexibilisation of labour. According to the report, in 2014, the 
proportion of Dutch employees with a flexible work relationship has again 
increased, to 22% (2004: 15%), putting the Netherlands in the top three 
EU15 countries with high rates of labour market flexibility, behind Portugal 
and Spain. The percentage of solo self-employed workers has also in-
creased, causing the percentage of permanent jobs to fall to 62% (73% in 
2004). 
 
With regard to social security, it is worthwhile mentioning that there is a 
mixed system of national insurance schemes covering the entire population 
at a minimum level and employee insurance schemes providing income 
maintenance for wage earners. National insurance schemes in the Nether-
lands have been introduced for the risks of old age (AOW 1957), death 
(AWW 1959, currently Anw), children (AKW 1972), incapacity for work 
(AAW 1975 abolished in 1998) and special medical expenses (ABWZ 1976, 
currently Wlz).  
 
No national insurance schemes have been created to cover unemployment 
and illness; instead there are employee insurance schemes (WW and ZW). 
Nowadays the risk of incapacity for work also falls within the exclusive 
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scope of an employee insurance scheme (the WIA Act, the Dutch Work and 
Income (Employment Capacity) Act.  
 
There is no separate system in the Netherlands for accidents at work and 
occupational diseases. These risks are considered to be professionally 
covered by the employer’s civil liability that supplements the general sys-
tem providing protection in cases of incapacity for work under the WIA Act.  
 
A system of social assistance creates a general safety net under the sys-
tem.  
 
After the system was completed in the 1970s a reform process was started 
that is still on-going today. In the nineteen nineties the Dutch had a serious 
flirtation with the privatisation of their social security system. Traces of this 
can still be seen in the private administration of the insurance scheme for 
curative care (Zvw) and the employer’s obligation to continue to pay wages 
during the first two years of incapacity for work. This obligation to continue 
to pay wages replaces the employees’ entitlements under the ZW (the 
Dutch Sickness Benefits Act), which now simply acts as a safety net. In this 
two-year period, in addition to the requirement to continue to pay wages the 
employer is also required to make arrangements for the reintegration of 
employees who are ill. Private insurance companies and reintegration 
agencies can assist employers in carrying out this task.  
 
A subject that dominates the contemporary policy agenda is the position of 
self-employed workers. As mentioned, solo self-employment in the Nether-
lands has rapidly gained popularity. This development challenges the rift 
that exists in labour law and social security between the insiders who enjoy 
full social protection (wage earners) and those who are considered to be 
outsiders in the labour market (other categories of workers). According to 
many this rift is too wide. Just before submitting this report, the latest coali-
tion government in the Netherlands (Rutte III) has announced further 
measures to protect lower paid independent workers. See chapter 4. 
 
The main administrative organisations for the social insurance schemes are 
the UWV (Employee Insurance Agency) and the SVB (Social Insurance 
Bank). These are public bodies. Because they are somewhat distanced 
from the responsible minister, they are also referred as independent admin-
istrative bodies. The UWV and SVB have a technocratic management ap-
pointed by the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment. They are central 
organisations with regional offices. The ZVW (Dutch Healthcare Insurance 
Act) schemes are implemented by private healthcare insurance companies, 
with a coordinating task, for a public body: the Dutch Healthcare Authority. 
The Tax and Customs Administration plays its part in the social security 
system by collecting taxes and paying income-related allowances. And fi-
nally, municipalities have an increasing task in the area of social assis-
tance, reintegration and care. 
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1.2 The definitions of an ‘employee’ and ‘self-employment’ from the 
perspective of labour law and social security law 
1.2.1 Employment relationships under public or private law 
In first instance the distinction between employees and self-employment 
plays a specific role in the employee insurance schemes set up for the risks 
of illness (ZW), incapacity for work (Wet WIA) and unemployment (WW). 
Employees are insured under the employee insurance schemes. An em-
ployee is a natural person who has concluded an employment contract un-
der private or public law and has not yet reached standard retirement age.1 
 
An employment relationship under public law is based on an appointment 
by a public body. These employees are called civil servants.  
 
An employment relationship under private law is a relationship based on an 
employment contract as defined in the Dutch Civil Code. The employment 
contract is defined in the Dutch Civil Code as a contract in which the em-
ployee undertakes to work for the employer for a specific period of time in 
return for a wage (Article 7:610 Dutch Civil Code). Whether or not the em-
ployment relationship has the following features is decisive when establish-
ing whether an employment contract has been concluded: 
 
1. the employee’s obligation to perform the work in person; 
2. the employer’s obligation to pay a wage; and 
3. the relationship of subordination existing between the employer and 
the employee. 
 
Traditionally it is pointed out that the Dutch social security court (CRvB) 
uses a different bases for establishing whether or not there is an employ-
ment relationship than does the civil court. Whereas the civil court attaches 
more importance to the parties’ intentions when determining their employ-
ment relationship, the CRvB focuses on the factual relationship existing 
between the parties. In doing so the CRvB aims to stop parties from acquir-
ing a benefit or being granted a waiver of contributions on the basis of the 
contractual relationship. However, the significance of this different in ap-
proach between the two courts should not be overemphasised. Recent 
years have seen a trend towards more convergence.  
 
Most of the disputes heard by the CRvB regarding the existence of a pri-
vate employment relationship ultimately relate to the question of whether or 
not there is a factual relationship of subordination. Disputes about this issue 
often arise during short term, incidental employment relationships. Whether 
or not the facts in the case in question imply the existence of what is called 
a significant relationship of subordination is relevant. It should be estab-
lished that the employee is required to follow the employer’s instructions. 
————————— 
1 Article 3(1) ZW, Article 3(1) WW, Article 3(1) WAO and Article 8 (1) Wet WIA 
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Generally speaking, in cases where the work forms a significant part of the 
business operations, even if it is of an incidental nature, it can be estab-
lished that there is a relationship of subordination.  
1.2.2 Broadening the definition of ‘employee’ 
The definition of ‘employee’ for the purpose of the employee insurance 
schemes is not limited to employees who are employed on the basis of a 
private or public employment contract. The definition includes persons 
working in other employment relationships. These employment relation-
ships are treated in the same way as employment relationships in which 
employee insurance is compulsory. 
The term ‘fictitious employment relationship’ or ‘employment relationship by 
legal definition’ is then used. These are workers who have been brought 
under the protection of the employee insurance schemes because, in view 
of their social and economic position, they are treated the same as employ-
ees as defined in the Dutch Civil Code. It is a motley crew. Article 4 of the 
Dutch Sickness Benefits Act / Unemployment Act (ZW/WW), for example, 
stipulates that an employee is the person who performs work for which he 
or she has been contracted, unless he or she can be qualified as a self-
employed entrepreneur in the fiscal sense. In specific circumstances inter-
mediaries are also treated as employees. Article 5 ZW/WW extends the 
concept of employee further to musicians, professional sportsmen and 
women and homeworkers, at least inasmuch as they are not already classi-
fied as employees under private law.  
 
These groups that are also brought within the scope of the employee insur-
ance schemes are referred to in Dutch as ‘rariteiten’, or rarities. Additional 
conditions are attached to an individual ‘rarity’ decision. One of the aims of 
this arrangement is to exclude people whose participation in the labour pro-
cess has an ancillary nature, from the scope of the employee insurance 
schemes. Because of this the scope of the labour relationship is subject to 
certain minimums in terms of the number of working hours or duration of 
the work and earnings (at least 40% of the statutory minimum wage). The 
status of these people who are treated as employees differs in this respect 
from that of employees under private or public law, who, strangely enough, 
are insured regardless of the scope of their employment. 
1.2.3 Limiting the definition of employee 
The definition of employee is subject to several limitations. For instance, 
persons working fewer than four days a week in a private person’s house-
hold, fall outside the scope of the employee insurance schemes (Article 6 
(1c) ZW/WW): the cleaner, the gardener and the home carer. A home carer 
is usually found through a home care agency, but might occasionally be 
employed by the care recipient. In this case the home carer is not insured 
under the employee insurance schemes if he or she provides care for fewer 
than four days a week. The legislator's intention here is to save the private 
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employer from the administrative red tape that is inherent to the employer 
status (keeping payroll records, deducting and paying social insurance con-
tributions etc.). 
1.2.4 Self-employed workers and the employee insurances schemes 
The problem of proof 
From the above it is clear that the employee insurance schemes are not 
intended for self-employed workers. And neither, therefore, do they have to 
pay any contributions. The circumstances under which the work is per-
formed ultimately determine whether or not a person should be treated as a 
self-employed worker. To reduce the uncertainty surrounding this issue the 
contract concluded by a self-employed worker with the customer can be 
assessed in advance by the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration. This 
authority establishes beforehand whether or not the contract can be con-
sidered (ficticious) employment. The criteria on which the Dutch Tax and 
Customs Administration bases its assessment are set out in the ‘Handrei-
king beoordelingskader arbeidsrelaties (guidelines for assessing employ-
ment relationships)’ (www.belastingdienst.nl) If there is no evidence of (fic-
ticious) employment the parties involved will not be required to pay any 
contributions for a period of five years. However, the Tax and Customs 
Administration continues to check whether the work is performed in ac-
cordance with the contract assessed by it. If it emerges later that a self-
employed worker has in fact performed the work as an employee, the 
commissioner of work will have to pay the contributions to the Tax and Cus-
toms Administration. This is the system established by the Act Deregulating 
the Assessment of Employment Relationships (DBA) that entered into force 
on 1 May 2016. However, the new system turned out to be hard to imple-
ment in practice. For this reason the government decided to suspend the 
enforcement of the act until 1 January 2018. In the meantime whether or 
not the system can be revised is being looked into.   
Voluntary insurance 
People falling outside the scope of the employee insurance schemes can 
opt to take out voluntary insurance. In this way, for instance, domestic staff 
can still be insured. This also allows people temporarily not working or who 
start working on a self-employed basis to remain insured. This is subject to 
the requirement that these people register to continue their insurance on a 
voluntary basis within thirteen weeks of their compulsory insurance ending. 
1.2.5 The risk of sickness  
System 
Sickness is understood to mean ‘short term’ absence. ‘Short term’ means a 
period of absence of, in principle, 104 weeks. The loss of income of em-
ployees who are unable to work due to illness can be compensated in sev-
eral ways. In the Netherlands this is compensated by requiring employers 
to continue to pay wages for a specific period of time. This requirement is 
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an employment right and is arranged for the market sector in Article 7:629 
of the Dutch Civil Code. The second method is that of social security. In 
that case an employee who falls ill has a statutory right to a benefit paid out 
by an administrative body, which is financed collectively from contributions. 
These two methods co-exist and complement (and supplement) each other. 
1.2.5.1 Protection under labour law during illness 
Conditions 
Article 7:629 of the Dutch Civil Code simply provides that during periods of 
incapacity to work due to illness employees retain their right to the contin-
ued payment of (part of) their wage for a period of two years. This provision 
forms the very core of the obligation to continue to pay wages during ill-
ness. The right to continued payment of wages during periods of illness 
requires first and foremost the existence of an employment contract as de-
fined in Article 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code. The Dutch Sickness Benefits 
Act (ZW) is a safety net for employees who do not (any longer) have an 
employment contract. Secondly it is essential that the employee is unable 
to perform the contracted work due to illness. The law does not provide any 
further definition of the term ‘illness’. This has to be interpreted with refer-
ence to the definition previously developed within the scope of the ZW.2  
Amount 
Article 7:629 (1) of the Dutch Civil Code limits the amount that the employer 
has to pay in relation to each day of illness to 70% of the maximum daily 
wage. In turn, this wage is based on the maximum salary threshold for na-
tional insurance (the gross wage from which the maximum employee insur-
ance contribution may be deducted). On 1 July 2017 this was € 203.85 a 
day.  
 
In practice the employer often has to continue to pay 90% or 100% of the 
full wage. This more generous requirement is based on the applicable col-
lective or individual employment contract. The additional obligations should 
not total more than 170% of the wage in the first two years. This generally 
means that in the second year of sickness the employee’s benefit decreas-
es from 90 or 100% of the wage to about 70%. The idea is that this de-
crease will motivate the employee 
to resume work as soon as possible.  
Duration 
Employers are obliged to continue to pay wages for up to 104 weeks, for 
domestic staff this is up to six weeks (Article 7:629 (1, 2) of the Dutch Civil 
Code). The first day on which the employee stops working because of ill-
ness is day one for the calculation. Periods of illness that last fewer than 
four weeks are added together (Article 7:629 (10) of the Dutch Civil Code). 
If the interruption between two periods of illness lasts longer than four 
weeks the term of 104 weeks is broken. If the employee falls ill again after 
————————— 
2 Parliamentary papers II 1995/96, 24 439, No. 3, p. 57–59 
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having resumed work for longer than four weeks, a new period of 104 
weeks starts, provided the conditions set out in Article 7:629 (1) of the 
Dutch Civil Code are met. 
 
The 104 week period stipulated in Article 7:629 of the Dutch Civil Code is in 
line with the regular waiting period for the Dutch Work and Income (Capaci-
ty for Work) Act or ‘WIA’ (Article 23 WIA). A person only qualifies for a ben-
efit under this act when the right to continued payment of wages ends (Arti-
cle 43b WIA). As a rule this will be the case when the employee has been 
incapacitated for work as referred to in Article 7:629 of the Dutch Civil Code 
for two consecutive years. Sometimes there might be an extended obliga-
tion to continue to pay wages if the employer has made insufficient effort to 
find suitable work for the ill employee. The waiting period can then be ex-
tended by up to one additional year (52 weeks).  
1.2.5.2 The Sickness Benefits Act as a safety net 
Conditions 
Sickness benefits are, in principle, not paid under the Sickness Benefits Act 
to ill employees who are entitled to the continued payment of their wages 
under Article 7:629 of the Dutch Civil Code (Article 29 (1) ZW). It is, howev-
er, paid to people working in fictitious employment. Sickness benefit is also 
paid to insured people who have no employer. This might, for example, be 
employees who are ill when their temporary contract expires. But employ-
ees with a permanent employment contract that is terminated by way of 
cancellation, dissolution or with the agreement of both parties also fall with-
in this category. In other words if they are ill when they leave employment 
they will be eligible for sickness benefit. 
Amount 
Sickness benefit is usually 70% of the employee’s daily wage. This daily 
wage is linked to the maximum salary threshold for national insurance.  
 
Duration 
Sickness benefit is paid for a period of 104 weeks. For insured people who 
are ill when they leave employment, the rule applies that the continued 
payment of wages and sickness benefit together may never be paid for a 
period in excess of 104 weeks. The first day of the incapacity for work is 
day one for the calculations. 
Contributions and financing 
The Dutch Sickness Benefits Act is implemented by the Employed Person’s 
Insurance Administration Agency (UWV) and financed from contribution 
payments. Small employers pay a sector contribution. Medium enterprises 
pay a contribution that is partly determined by the sector and partly deter-
mined individually. Large employers pay a differentiated, individual contri-
bution. The amount of the individual contribution depends of the number of 
insured people without an employer who received a sickness benefit two 
years ago via the employer in question. This is intended to reduce the in-
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creasing number of flexible workers applying for a benefit under the WIA. 
The higher contributions payable by medium and large enterprises when 
flexible workers receive sickness benefit are intended to give an extra in-
centive to employers to prevent flexible workers from stopping work due to 
illness.  
 
Employers can opt to pay the sickness benefit themselves. In that case 
they are considered to bear the risk of employee incapacity themselves 
(Article 63a-63d ZW). Employers who bear the risk of employee incapacity 
themselves pay sickness benefit to employees who have fallen ill on behalf 
of the UWV. They are also responsible for checks and providing support 
during illness. 
1.2.6 The risk of parenthood 
Antenatal and postnatal benefit and a childbirth benefit 
The right to antenatal benefit and a childbirth benefit is regulated in the 
Dutch Work and Care Act (WAZO) (Article 3:8 WAZO). This benefit is paid 
for a period of six weeks prior to the estimated due date until the actual 
birth date of the child and afterwards for ten week, starting on the day after 
the birth. If the women does not use the full six weeks before the birth of 
her child, this is compensated after the birth. The antenatal and postnatal 
benefit and childbirth benefit amounts to 100% of the daily wage. Whether 
or not the woman is incapacitated for work does not affect this benefit. 
Illness during pregnancy 
During incapacity for work while on antenatal and childbirth leave the ante-
natal and postnatal benefit and childbirth benefit continue to be paid as 
usual (Article 29a (3) ZW). Women who become incapacitated for work in 
connection with pregnancy or childbirth who are not yet on antenatal or 
childbirth leave are entitled to a sickness benefit equal to 100% of their dai-
ly wage (Article 29a ZW). This is, however, subject to the requirement that 
they accept suitable work if the incapacity for work starts after the antenatal 
and childbirth leave has expired (Article 29a (6) ZW). 
Pregnancy and self-employment 
Woman who are self-employed are entitled to a childbirth benefit equal to at 
least the minimum wage for at least sixteen weeks (Article 3:18 and Article 
3:21-3:27 Work and Care Act (WAZO)). As an alternative to the childbirth 
benefit the woman can opt for a benefit that is used to hire a replacement 
during her antenatal and childbirth leave. The replacement should be ap-
pointed by a professional agency. The benefit is paid to the agency (Article 
3:21 WAZO).  
Parental leave 
Except for three days’ leave for the new father, there is no right to paid pa-
rental leave in the Netherlands. However, under the Work and Care Act 
there is a right to unpaid leave until the child’s eighth birthday. This right is 
equal to 26 times the number of hours worked per week. In practice some 
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employers continue to pay wages (in part) on grounds of arrangements 
made in collective labour agreements. The latest coalition government 
Rutte III has announced the introduction paid paternity leave for a period 
six weeks. At the time of writing there is no legislative proposal yet.  
Children 
In the Netherlands parents are paid child allowance under the Dutch Gen-
eral Child Allowance Act (AKW). This is not an employee insurance 
scheme but a national insurance scheme. In other words, all Dutch resi-
dents are, in principle, entitled to this. Child allowance is a contribution by 
the community to the long-term cost of bringing up and caring for children. 
Parents have first responsibility and so child allowance covers about 30% 
of the cost of bringing up an average child. Child allowance is financed from 
taxation so you would expect this to be a social facility. However, legally it 
bears more resemblance to a national insurance scheme. 
 
Other important schemes are the child-base budget and the childcare al-
lowance. These are income-related schemes, the more you earn, the lower 
the benefit. Just as the child allowance under the AKW, these schemes too 
are based on Dutch residency.  
 
All the child schemes described above are financed from general taxation. 
So no contributions are payable. 
1.2.7 The risk of accidents at work 
In the Netherlands incapacity for work due to an accident at work is no 
longer regulated separately. In 1967 the Dutch Accidents Act was integrat-
ed into what was then called the Occupational Disability Insurance Act 
(WAO) and is now the WIA. Since then how someone became incapacitat-
ed for work is no longer important. Today the general scheme is regulated 
in the WIA with alongside this the possibility to recover the work-related 
loss from the employer under Article 7:658 of the Dutch Civil Code. The 
employer’s liability for paid employees is arranged in paragraph 1 and 2. 
Solo self-employed workers are referred to paragraph 4. Assessments re-
lating to this group should take into account all the facts of the case so the 
result cannot be anticipated beforehand.3  
1.2.8 The risk of disability 
System 
After a period of incapacity for work lasting 104 weeks the Work and In-
come (Capacity for Work) Act or ‘WIA’ comes into play. This is an employ-
ee insurance scheme. As in the Sickness Benefits Act self-employed work-
ers are in principle excluded. The act has two schemes: the Return to Work 
————————— 
3 Allspan case 
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Scheme for the Partially Disabled (WGA) and the Income Protection 
Scheme for the Full and Permanently Disabled (IVA).  
 
The WGA is intended for people who are still able to perform work despite 
their impairments. They are activated in different ways to do so. The IVA is 
intended for people who are virtually unable to perform any work at all. For 
them income protection is a priority. Just like the Sickness Benefits Act 
(ZW), the WIA treats the risk of incapacity for work as a social risk (risque 
social). The cause of the incapacity for work is irrelevant. 
 
Until recently young people with disabilities fell within the scope of the Work 
and Employment Support for Disabled Young Persons Act (Wajong). This 
is a social facility available to all Dutch residents. Unlike the WIA, this act 
makes no clear distinction between young people with disabilities who are 
permanently and fully unable to work and young people with disabilities 
who are still able to perform some work. Since 1 January 2015 this latter 
group falls within the scope of the Participation Act (see Chapter 10). The 
Wajong is still valid for young persons with disabilities who are permanently 
and fully unable to work and for young persons with disabilities who can 
perform work and who received a Wajong benefit on 1 January 2015.  
Conditions 
To qualify for an incapacity for work benefit an individual must be unable to 
work. This is the case when two conditions are met: 
1. There must be a loss of earning capacity. This is established if an indi-
vidual’s impairments mean that he or she is unable to earn an income 
that is equivalent to the income a similar healthy individual earns per-
forming generally accepted work. The yardstick for ‘similar and healthy’ 
is the incapacitated employee. 
2. The loss of earning capacity has to be a direct consequence of illness 
and it must be possible to establish this illness objectively. In other 
words there has to be a causal connection between the loss of earning 
capacity and the medical impairment.  
The incapacity for work should be at least 35% of the individual’s capacity 
(in the Wajong this is 25%).  
Amount and duration  
An IVA benefit is paid to insured people who are fully and permanently in-
capacitated for work (Article 4 WIA). The IVA benefit is 75% of the monthly 
wage and is paid until the beneficiary reaches retirement age or earlier in 
the event of death. 
  
The WGA benefit is payable to individuals who are partially incapacitated 
for work. Partial incapacity starts when an individual’s incapacity percent-
age is at least 35% (Article 5 WIA). In addition to these individuals who are 
still able to earn an income from work, people who are fully but not perma-
nently incapacitated for work also fall in this category. They also qualify for 
a WGA benefit. In practice these people form the largest group of WGA 
beneficiaries.  
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The WGA benefit has several varieties (Article 54 (3, 4) WIA). The wage-
related WGA benefit is usually first. This wage-related WGA benefit is paid 
for at least three months and sometimes longer. When an individual has 
worked for four years, one month of benefit is accrued for each year of em-
ployment (Article 59 WIA). Since 1 January 2016 the maximum is 24 
months.  
 
On the expiry of the wage-related benefit period an individual might be eli-
gible for a wage supplementation. This wage supplementation can be pay-
able until the beneficiary reaches retirement age as long as the income 
requirement continues to be met, in other words that the individual earns a 
certain amount of income from work. If, for instance due to dismissal, this is 
no longer the case, the wage supplementation is converted into a continua-
tion benefit. This continuation benefit equals a specific percentage of the 
statutory minimum wage.  
Contributions and financing  
The Wajong is financed from general taxation. The WIA expenditures are 
paid from contributions. Employers can opt to bear the excess of the WGA 
risk themselves (Article 83 (2) WIA). They can insure the financial risk of 
doing so at a private insurance company. Sometimes the employer bearing 
the excess will pay the benefits themselves. Another option is that the Em-
ployee Insurance Administration Agency (UWV) might pay the benefit and 
subsequently recover this from the employer bearing the excess. 83 (3) 
WIA). Employers bearing the excess are also responsible for the reintegra-
tion of the employee.  
1.2.9 The risk of unemployment 
System 
First of all Dutch workers are protected under labour law against unem-
ployment through the transition allowance. This allowance was introduced 
on the implementation of the Dutch Work and Security Act (WWZ) in 2015 
and is not also intended to facilitate the transition to new work. A transition 
allowance is payable to employees whose employment contract lasted 
longer than 24 months and provided it was the employer who decided to 
terminate or not renew the contract. When the contract ended on the initia-
tive of the employee there should be evidence of a serious culpable act or 
omission on the part of the employer. In that case, moreover, the district 
court can grant the employee fair compensation, although only when there 
is evidence of exceptional behaviour.  
 
In addition to the transition allowance there is another system of unem-
ployment benefits governed by the Dutch Unemployment Act (the WW).  
Conditions 
Just like the Sickness Benefit Act (ZW) and the Work and Income (Capacity 
for Work) Act (WIA), the WW is an employee insurance scheme. In other 
words, to qualify for unemployment benefit an individual has to be an em-
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ployee. The WW distinguishes between the creation of a right to benefit 
and enforcing this. There are three conditions for the creation of this right: 
the employee must be insured, must be unemployed and must meet the 
eligibility requirement.  
 
The definition of unemployment is a technical one. The employee must 
have lost working hours and be available for work. That the employee must 
not be at fault for the unemployment is not part of the statutory definition 
but is reflected in the form of an obligation on the part of the employee. 
Failure to fulfil this obligation can in the worst case result in an application 
for benefit being refused.  
 
The eligibility requirement requires that the unemployed employee has per-
formed work for at least 26 weeks as an employee in a period of 36 weeks 
directly preceding the first day of unemployment. 17 WW). How many hours 
a week were worked is irrelevant. Neither do the weeks have to be consec-
utive and the employee can also have performed the work in other em-
ployment relationships as long as these lie within the eligibility period (Arti-
cle 17a (2) WW).  
Amount and duration 
In the first two months the unemployment benefit is 75% and from the third 
month 70% of the difference between the monthly wage and the wage 
earned from work. If no income is earned the benefit is first 75% and after 
two months 70% of the monthly wage.  
 
This unemployment benefit is paid for at least three months. This minimum 
duration can, however, be extended if the employment history requirement 
is met. To do so the employee should prove that in the five years immedi-
ately prior to the year in which the unemployment started, he or she was 
paid a wage for at least 52 days during at least four years, or, from 1 Janu-
ary 2013, has performed paid work during at least 208 hours. Note: the 
year in which the employee became unemployed is not counted, even 
when work was performed in almost every month of this year.  
 
If the employee meets the employment history requirement, the minimum 
payment duration of three months is extended by one month. The basic 
principle here is that the payment duration in months is the same as the 
employment history in years. So a person who has worked for eight years 
is entitled to a benefit for eight months. Until 1 January 2016 this was sub-
ject to a maximum of 38 months. From that date the maximum is being 
gradually reduced to 24 months. The payment duration per quarter is re-
duced each time by one month. This transitional period will run until 1 July 
2019.  
Starters’ scheme for self-employed workers 
Unemployed people, who aim to start their own company in self-
employment, can take advantage of the Starters’ Scheme (Article 77a 
WW). Under this scheme they can obtain permission from the UWV to start 
an independent company or profession without this automatically resulting 
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in a loss of benefit rights. In other words they can perform their work in self-
employment while retaining their benefit (Article 78 WW). The benefit is, 
however, reduced by a fixed amount of 29% of the full benefit amount (Arti-
cle 47b WW).  
Contributions 
The WW is financed from a sector contribution and an unemployment con-
tribution. The sector contribution covers the first six months’ benefit and 
varies according to the risk of unemployment in the relevant sector. The 
unemployment contribution is used to finance the other expenditures. This 
contribution is the same for industry as a whole (2016: 2.07%), the non-
contributory threshold has been abolished. Both contributions are paid by 
the employer. The wage on which the unemployment contributions have to 
be paid is capped at € 203.85 a day (1 July 2016). Public-sector employers 
pay no unemployment contributions. They bear the cost of benefits them-
selves and thus bear the excess for the risk of unemployment.  
1.2.10 The risk of old age 
System 
The General Old Age Pensions Act (AOW) provides all Dutch residents 
with a basic pension. The retirement age is no longer 65 but is being grad-
ually increased to 67 years. However, stopping work is not a condition for 
receiving AOW. The AOW system is straightforward. Each resident (or non-
resident working in the Netherlands) is automatically insured and accrues 
pension entitlements each year during the fifty years preceding the stand-
ard retirement age (accrued insurance). This is based on a linear accrual 
system. For every year of insurance 2% of the full AOW pension is built up. 
People insured for the full fifty years before retirement receive a full AOW 
pension.  
 
The amount of the AOW pension is in line with the social minimum. This is 
based on the customary rates of the net minimum wage (50% for married 
people and 70% for single people). This will be looked at in more detail in 
section 6.5. 
Conditions 
There are several grounds for insurance pursuant to the AOW (and the 
other national insurance schemes and the General Child Allowance Act). 
First of all people resident in the Netherlands are insured. People residing 
in the Netherlands are insured. Secondly people living abroad and working 
as an employee or in self-employment in the Netherlands are insured. The 
minimum insurance duration is one year. 
 
Anyone who has not built up rights to a full pension because they lived or 
worked abroad for some years has 2% for each non-insured year deducted 
from his or her pension. To avoid this deduction it is possible to opt to take 
out voluntary insurance. For example, employees who have been posted 
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abroad for some years by their employers can take advantage of the volun-
tary AOW insurance scheme.  
Amount and duration 
The AOW system provides for two benefits: (1) the old age pension and (2) 
the supplement.  
 
A married person whose partner is younger than the retirement age is enti-
tled to a supplement of 50% of the (net) minimum wage in addition to his or 
her AOW pension of 50% (Article 9 (7) AOW). From 2015 no new entitle-
ments to a partner supplement can be created.  
The AOW pension is not income-related, the supplement, however, is. The 
income test relates exclusively to the pensioner’s partner’s income (Article 
10 and 11 AOW). Any income earned by the pensioner is not taken into 
account. The income test allows for some exemptions.  
Contributions and financing 
The AOW’s financing is based on the pay-as-you-go system. The cost of 
paying the pensions is covered by the income from contributions paid by 
people in work in the relevant year. Contributions are calculated on the con-
tribution base. If no contributions are paid because someone earns no in-
come, this does not affect the pension. AOW contributions are levied by the 
Dutch Tax and Customs Administration. This is done in combination with 
the levy of the wage and income tax. The AOW also has a contribution from 
general taxation. This is in connection with Article 11 (1) of the Dutch Social 
Insurance (Funding) Act, which establishes that the AOW contribution will 
not exceed 18.25%. This ceiling means that contribution shortfalls will in-
creasingly have to be supplemented by a government contribution from 
general taxation. 
Second pillar pensions 
AOW is the only source of income for only a minority of pensioners. More 
than 90% of AOW beneficiaries have a supplementary pension based on a 
company pension fund or a branch or professional pension fund. Participa-
tion in such a supplementary pension scheme is sometimes mandatory. 
Examples of this are the ABP schemes for public-sector employees and 
special education and the branch pension fund scheme for the Dutch metal 
industry. General practitioners, midwives and civil-law notaries have a 
(mandatory) professional pension scheme.  
 
Alongside the AOW and the collective, supplementary pension schemes 
there are also private pension arrangements concluded at insurance com-
panies. An example of this is the annuity contract. The AOW, the collective 
and the individual old age arrangements display a measure of cohesion. 
For this reason the system of old age arrangements is also referred to as 
the three-pillar or three-layer system. This is an example of public and pri-
vate social security arrangements supplementing each other. 
 
The supplementary pension has its origin in an agreement between the 
employer and the employee. This is usually a collective labour agreement. 
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The legal framework applying to this agreement is detailed in the Dutch 
Pension Act. This Pension Act defines pensions as ‘the old age pension, 
incapacity for work pension or surviving dependent's pension agreed be-
tween the employer and the employee’ (Article 1 Pension Act). A character-
istic of the definition of pension is that this is a benefit paid, in principle, for 
an indefinite period of time; this is indeed the case for these three risks.  
1.2.11 Surviving dependents’ pensions  
System 
Surviving dependents are protected by the General Surviving Dependent’s 
Act (Anw). This scheme entered into effect on 1 July 1996 to replace the 
General Act on Widows and Orphans (AWW). It is a risk insurance. This is 
apparent from the fact that the right to benefit is created if the insured per-
son was insured at the time of death, without the benefit amount varying 
according to the number of years the person had been insured.  
Conditions  
The Anw is a national insurance scheme. The scope of insured persons is 
therefore the same as that for the AOW and other national insurance 
schemes. Everyone residing in the Netherlands is in principle insured. 
Those people living abroad but working in the Netherlands either as an 
employee or in self-employment are also insured.  
 
The right to benefit is conferred on specific surviving relatives of the de-
ceased person: the insured person’s surviving partner and the insured per-
son’s surviving children. The deceased person must have been insured at 
the time of death. The Anw does not require the deceased to have been 
insured for a specific period prior to his or her death.  
Amount and duration 
The Anw provides for two benefits: the surviving dependent’s benefit and 
the orphan’s benefit. A surviving dependent is the spouse of the person 
who was insured at the time of death under the Anw (Article 1 Anw). The 
spouse is in the first place the marital partner. Also treated as a spouse is 
the registered partner and the unmarried adult who ran a joint household 
with an (adult) deceased person.  
 
Under Article 14 Anw a surviving dependent has the right to a surviving 
dependent’s benefit if he or she is: 
 
1. an unmarried child younger than 18 years; or 
2. has a degree of incapacity for work of at least 45%; or 
3. was born before 1 January 1950.  
 
The surviving dependent’s benefit is 70% of the minimum wage, specifical-
ly, € 1,173 a month (2017). The benefit payable to the surviving dependent 
who runs a joint household with a person in need of care is 50% of the min-
imum wage. The legislator considers the surviving dependent’s benefit to 
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be a supplement to the surviving dependent’s other income. So the benefit 
acts as a minimum income arrangement for people with insufficient income. 
The effect of the income tests means that when € 2,503 (2017) a month is 
earned, the surviving dependent’s benefit is reduced to nil. Eighty per cent 
of the people with a surviving dependent’s benefit is female. Male surviving 
dependents more often have their own income, which is also often higher 
than that of female surviving dependents. 
 
An orphan is entitled to an orphan’s benefit subject to certain conditions 
being met (Article 26 Anw). An orphan is a full orphan: a child younger than 
16 years who no longer has any parents following the death of his or her 
insured father and/or mother.  
Contributions and financing 
The cost of the Anw is largely covered by contributions. The contribution is 
0.6%, payable on maximum € 33,716 (2017). Contributions are paid by the 
insured people. The payable contributions are levied by the Dutch Tax and 
Customs Administration.  
Second pillar pensions 
The Anw is a mandatory basic income in the event of death. In many cases 
this is supplemented through schemes based on the employment relation-
ship. Moreover, death insurance is often taken out at a private insurance 
company. This layered system of public and private arrangements is also 
applied to the risks of old age and incapacity for work. 
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2 Information on the inclusion of the following 
working groups in the social security systems 
2.1 (Solo) Self-employment 
2.1.1 General 
Solo self-employed workers are sometimes hard to define in relation to la-
bour law. There is no conclusive legal definition. The absence of an em-
ployment contract tends to be decisive, as a result of which the self-
employed worker has to rely on the contract for services (Article 7:400 of 
the Dutch Civil Code) or the contract for work (Article 7:850 of the Dutch 
Civil Code).  
 
The solo self-employed worker performs work personally for another at his 
or her own risk, in the majority of cases based on a contract for services. 
Work might be performed in the grey area between an employment con-
tract and a contract for services. This is the case, for example, with bogus 
self-employment. Jurisprudence in relation to this is on a very case-by-case 
basis. The case law on, for instance, the legal status of post distributors, 
triggered by the FNV trade union has a high profile. The largest postal 
company, postbedrijfNL traditionally used employees working for a wage 
but suddenly introduced a new business model in which the post deliverers 
were required to conclude contracts for service as solo self-employed 
workers with the company. Many courts ruled this to be a bogus construc-
tion but on appeal the Arnhem-Leeuwarden court of law 
(ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:6621) and the Amsterdam court of law 
(ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2686) confirmed that the solo self-employed work-
ers did indeed deliver post for PostNL as solo self-employed workers. Ac-
cording to the courts the parties’ intention as well as the actual performance 
of the work indicated that the parties’ wanted to conclude a contract for 
services. 
 
Solo self-employed workers are in principle excluded from the employee 
insurance schemes, unless there is a bogus employment relationship (see 
Chapter 1). It is, however, possible voluntary continue their insurance: 
when an employee switches to self-employment, he or she has the option 
to voluntarily continue their insurance. To do so they must submit a request 
within thirteen weeks after the end of the mandatory insurance to the UWV. 
 
Whether a person works in solo employment is established in the Nether-
lands by the Customs and Tax Administration, at least inasmuch as this 
regards tax legislation and social security. This assessment is based on a 
combination of several aspects that are considered in conjunction with one 
another. These aspects are derived from the tax and social security legisla-
tion (which partly refer back to typical definitions used in labour law). 
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 Is, for example profit made or is there a profit objective in the case of 
a starter.  
 Does the solo self-employed worker do the work him or herself, how 
does this compare to the employees working at the same company.  
 The number of hours spent working for the company is important, for 
the diverse deductibles this is set at a minimum of 1225 hours a year.  
 A check is also made to see whether the solo self-employed worker 
has invested capital in their company and whether any entrepreneuri-
al risks are attached to this, for example if customers fail to pay.  
 The number of customers is important, the solo self-employed work-
er’s risk is spread when there are more customers.  
 Does the solo self-employed worker bear liability for the work and 
does he or she actively present him or herself as a self-employed 
person to the public?  
 
The Tax and Customs Administration’s assessment system is a contentious 
issue. As explained in Chapter 1 above, the contract that a self-employed 
worker concludes with the customer can be assessed in advance by the 
Dutch Tax and Customs Administration. This authority establishes before-
hand whether or not the contract can be considered (fictitious) employment. 
If there is no evidence of (fictitious) employment the commissioner of work 
can, in principle, safely assume for a period of five years that he will not be 
required to pay any contributions. As mentioned, this system was intro-
duced alongside the Employment Relationships (Deregulation) Act (DBA). 
However soon after its implementation on 1 May 2016 it became clear that 
in practice it was hard to enforce. For this reason the government decided 
to suspend the enforcement of the act until 1 January 2018. In the mean-
time whether or not the system can be revised is being looked into.   
 
Solo self-employed workers are currently the focus of much political atten-
tion in the Netherlands because in recent years this group has increased 
significantly without self-employed workers always having a say in the mat-
ter. The former system of registration of self-employed workers that was in 
force until 1 May 2016, the ‘VAR’ (Declaration of Independent Contractor 
Status) imposed the risk of a wrongful registration on the employee. This 
made it attractive to employers to use (bogus) self-employed workers rather 
than employees working for a wage. Solo self-employed workers have no 
protection against dismissal, do mostly not build up any pension in the sec-
ond pillar and are not automatically insured against illness and incapacity 
for work. However, a uniform solution for this lack of social protection  has 
not come into being. According to many this is not  desirable given the 
group’s diversity. For further developments see Chapter 4.  
2.1.2 Solo self-employment and the risk of sickness 
Solo self-employed workers are not entitled to continued payment during 
illness, nor can they apply for a sickness benefit. For a safety net in the 
event of sickness solo self-employed workers today have to rely on individ-
ual incapacity for work insurance (AOV) or join a ‘Broodfonds’ (literally: 
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bread fund). Four out of every five solo self-employed workers have not 
taken out AOV, usually because they find this too expensive. The solo self-
employed workers who are insured pay contributions of around 7 or 8% of 
their annual income.4 Research conducted by the Social and Economic 
Council (SER) in the Netherlands shows that to receive a benefit of EUR 
32,000 a year, contributions of about 15% have to be paid.  
Due to the high cost of incapacity for work insurance, in recent years 
‘broodfonds’ have been set up.5 A group of self-employed workers deposit 
a specific amount each month on their own bank account. How much this is 
depends on the benefit they will need in the event of illness. When a mem-
ber leaves the fund he or she keeps the money they have saved. An indi-
vidual can only join such a fund after being introduced by a participant. 
These funds work well because they are based on the principle of like-
knows-like, as a result absence due to illness is low and the trust placed is 
not easily misused. To keep it this way the maximum size of a fund is 50 
participants. The ‘broodfonds’ is reminiscent of the guilds and feudal institu-
tions and thus dates back many years as well as being a new phenome-
non. Despite the growing popularity it remains a marginal phenomenon.6 
Self-employed workers seeking to take out private incapacity for work in-
surance (AOV) have to go through a technical and medical acceptance 
procedure.7 In the first case the insurance company assesses what condi-
tions it will attach to the insurance and whether it indeed wishes to offer 
insurance. The insurer offers AOV insurance based on the principle that the 
insurer is free to decide whether to accept the self-employed person or not.  
“An insurer is in principle free to decide whether or not it wants to 
conclude an insurance contract (…) or whether it wants to do so sub-
ject to restrictive conditions. It can base this decision on its own as-
sessment of the value of the risk. Its decision as to whether or not it 
will enter into an insurance contract (...) and whether or not restrictive 
condition will apply is part of its business strategy, which strategy 
cannot, except in exceptional cases, be assessed by the Council.”8 
On acceptance the insurer is bound by the ban on discrimination set out in 
Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which does not mean that no distinctions 
and classification into different risk groups are allowed. The Equal Treat-
ment Act also plays a part when assessing whether insurance is refused 
based on a banned discrimination such as sex, race or religion.  
During the medical acceptance procedure the medical adviser’s assess-
ment plays a major role. This defines the risk. The insurer then establishes 
whether the self-employed worker seeking insurance is eligible for AOV 
and if so, under what conditions. The medical adviser must be in a position 
to act objectively and independently of the insurer, on the basis of Article 
————————— 
4 Pension Advice 2017/85 
5 Hilhort, Sociale veerkracht als vangnet, s&d 5/6 | 2011, p.151. 
6 In 2016 9000 solo self-employed workers were affiliated to about 200 ‘broodfondsen’. Between 2010 and 2015 the ‘broodfondsen’ 
paid out in total almost 3.1 million euros to 452 solo self-employed workers who had fallen ill. This is EUR 6,800 per person. The 
average duration of the incapacity for work was almost six months. http://singelpd.nl/nieuws/zzp/groeiend-aantal-solo self-employed 
workers-maakt-gebruik-broodfondsen  
7 Wervelman, De particuliere arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (R&P nr. VR5) 2016/2.2.3.1. 
8 KiFiD’s position; compare e.g. RvT 2004/19 and RvT 2001/37 (Med.). 
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7:435 of the Dutch Civil Code the adviser should duly observe the profes-
sional medical standard. The medical adviser can base the advice on the 
completed health certificate. However, the adviser can also opt to request 
medical information from third parties or to conduct a medical examination. 
The difference here compared to the collective AOV under which employ-
ees are insured through their employer and where such an examination 
before acceptance is not allowed, is significant.9 Generally speaking the 
self-employed worker seeking insurance has no choice and will have to 
accept the examination if required to do so. There is, however, a certain 
degree of protection given that the necessity of the examination has to be 
justified in a clearly defined examination objective.10 The amount and dura-
tion of the benefit obviously depends on what is agreed between the par-
ties. 
2.1.3 Solo self-employment and the risk of parenthood 
Just like all other Dutch citizens solo self-employed workers also receive 
child allowance, child-related allowance and childcare allowance when they 
meet the set requirements. These child-related benefits are based on resi-
dency and are paid from general taxation.  
 
Antenatal and postnatal leave for solo self-employed women 
Women who are self-employed are entitled to a childbirth benefit equal to at 
least the minimum wage for at least sixteen weeks (Article 3:18 and Article 
3:21-3:27 Work and Care Act (WAZO)). As an alternative to the childbirth 
benefit the woman can opt for a benefit that is used to hire a replacement 
during her antenatal and childbirth leave. The replacement should be ap-
pointed by a professional agency. The benefit is paid to the agency (Article 
3:21 WAZO). The WAZO contains no arrangements for self-employed men.  
2.1.4 Solo self-employment and the risk of accidents at work 
As explained above, the consequences of accidents at work are not insured 
separately in the Netherlands. All incapacity for work falls within the the 
scope of the WIA meaning that solo self-employed workers are excluded. 
When an employee suffers damage that goes beyond any compensation 
offered by a WIA benefit, the employee can recover this damage from his 
or her employer by invoking Article 7:658 (1, 2) of the Dutch Civil Code. 
This article is a lex specialis in relation to Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil 
Code, which sets out arrangements for general liability in the event of dam-
age. Article 7:658 sets out arrangements regarding the employer’s liability 
for damage suffered by the employee due to an accident at work. This arti-
cle can even be invoked when damage is suffered during bogus self-
employment. In such cases it must first be established that there is indeed 
a bogus construction.  
————————— 
9 Art. 4 (5) Medical Examinations Act (WMK). 
10 Art. 2 WMK 
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The text of the act implies that people who are truly self-employed should 
also be able to invoke the fourth paragraph. But this becomes less obvious 
when the explanatory note is read. In this the legislator says that this fourth 
paragraph is in the first place intended for agency work, hiring and con-
tracts for work. Solo self-employed workers usually work under a contract 
for services. Protection through this article is only possible in an indirect 
way. The legislator formulated this paragraph based on the principle that to 
be eligible for the protection offered by the act a self-employed person 
should have the same relationship with the employer as an employee. The 
risk here is that the reasoning is based too much on the idea of employ-
ment with the result that self-employed workers are drawn under the pro-
tection of labour law. In the Davelaar/Allspan case the Supreme Court11 
provided assessment criteria: solo self-employed workers should to be able 
to rely on the employer for their care and safety. Whether or not this is true 
depends on all the circumstances of the case. At the time of writing there is 
still too little case law to be able to detect a trend.  
2.1.5 Solo self-employment and the risk of disability 
On the coming into being of the various national insurance schemes, the 
legislator decided to exclude self-employed workers from insurance against 
long term incapacity for work. However in the 1970s the realisation dawned 
that general national insurance was after all needed because many self-
employed workers had not insured themselves. This culminated in the 
General Act on Incapacity for Work (AAW). The arrangements partly re-
sembled those under the AOW and partly those under the WAO, but be-
came the victim of their own success. The arrangements were exceptional-
ly generous. Anyone who was incapacitated for work longer than 52 weeks 
was entitled to benefit. This gave municipalities the perfect opportunity to 
get rid of people on social assistance who were hard to redeploy. So in 
1998 the act was replaced by two schemes, one for self-employed workers: 
the Self-employed Persons Act on Incapacity for Work. (WAZ)12 This act 
was to be short-lived, for various reasons all the parties involved wanted to 
be rid of it. Its enforcement was costly for the government because former 
AAW benefits still had to be paid. The employee associations were unen-
thusiastic because contributions were paid solely by employees, employers 
remained out of the picture. 
 
Since the abolition of the WAZ solo self-employed workers once again have 
to fend for themselves. In principle they do not qualify for a WIA benefit 
when they are incapacitated for work. However, an employee who decides 
to become self-employed does have the option of taking out voluntary in-
surance. Approximately two out of every three self-employed workers have 
not taken out private insurance against incapacity for work.13  
————————— 
11 ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BV0616, (Davelaar/Allspan Barneveld B.V.) 
12 Insurance against the financial consequences of long-term incapacity for work and a benefit scheme 
in connection with birth for self-employed workers, co-working spouses and other non-employees earning an income from work. 
13 Klosse 2017, p. 219. 
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2.1.6 Solo self-employment and the risk of unemployment 
Self-employed workers are not insured for unemployment benefit. Neither 
can employees making the switch to self-employment opt to continue in-
surance against unemployment.  
 
Unemployed people who aim to start their own company in self-
employment, can take advantage of the Starters’ Scheme (Article 77a 
WW). Under this scheme they can obtain permission from the UWV to start 
an independent company or profession without this automatically resulting 
in a loss of benefit rights. In other words they can perform their work in self-
employment while retaining their benefit (Article 78 WW). The benefit is, 
however, reduced by a fixed amount of 29% of the full benefit amount (Arti-
cle 47b WW). 
When the unemployed person does not opt to take advantage of the start-
ers’ scheme, when he or she starts work as a self-employed person they 
take the fictional earnings calculation into account (Article 1b (5) WW in 
conjunction with 47 WW). This calculation is based on the average number 
of paid hours that the starter has worked in the preceding 26 weeks. This 
number of hours is  
2.1.7 Solo self-employment and the risk of old age 
Every Dutch resident is entitled to an AOW benefit on reaching the stand-
ard retirement age, solo self-employed workers included. But it must be 
remembered that the AOW pension is a flat rate minimum benefit. For sup-
plementary pension entitlements people have to rely on the second and 
third pillar.  
Second pillar 
Solo self-employed workers are usually excluded from pension systems in 
the second pillar. Mandatory professional pension schemes for solo self-
employed workers only exist for medical professions and civil-law notaries. 
Both employees and self-employed workers participate in these profes-
sional pension funds. In total this is approximately 50,000 participants. 
There are also branch pension funds open to solo self-employed workers 
for plasterers and painters.14  
 
Employees who continue work in self-employment have the option to con-
tinue to save for their pension voluntarily for up to ten years. However the 
contributions for this are high; the self-employed person has to pay both the 
employee and employer contribution. It is probably because of this that 
interest in this option is so low. For solo self-employed workers who do not 
earn business profits this option is only for the duration of three years.  
 
————————— 
14 Goudswaard en Caminada 2017, p. 235. 
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In recent years several initiatives have arisen for pension funds for solo 
self-employed workers. But to date there is little interest in these.  
Third pillar 
One quarter of all solo self-employed workers has made no arrangements 
for their old age in the third pillar. Better pension arrangements tend to be 
made as the business becomes more profitable. In most cases people save 
or invest, investing in their own home is also popular.  
 
Self-employed workers do have several tax benefits in relation to their old 
age.15 First of all there is the annuity contribution deduction, a fiscally at-
tractive way to save or invest for an old age benefit. In addition, advantage 
can be taken of the Fiscal Old Age Reserve (FOR). In 2017 up to 9.8% of 
the profit subject to a maximum of € 8,946 can be deducted from the profit. 
This is a deferred tax debt, the Tax and Customs Administration will still 
have to be paid later. And there is also the ‘suspension annuity’ (on sus-
pension of business profit on suspension can be converted into an annuity), 
this is the last chance for a person suspending their business to build up a 
tax-based income. Since 2016 there is a (tax) concession that ensures self-
employed workers are not required to have recourse to their pension sav-
ings when they apply for social assistance. As a result of this measure it 
can be expected that self-employed workers will start to save more be-
cause their pension is safe when they are in danger of having to rely on 
social assistance. 
 
Surviving dependents’ pensions (widow's or widower's or orphan's pen-
sion), on which conditions 
Just like the AOW the ANW (surviving dependent’s pension) is a national 
insurance scheme and thus also open to solo self-employed workers.  
2.1.8 Any important reforms within the last few years?  
Due to the explosive growth in the group of solo self-employed workers 
discussions have arisen regarding whether or not more protection and 
rights should be available to these workers. The answer to this question is 
apparently not easy. This is mainly because the group is so differentiated. It 
is precisely freedom and opportunities that truly self-employed workers 
seek and benefit from. The concerns relate primarily to bogus self-
employed workers who are more or less forced to become self-employed 
because they would otherwise be made redundant.  
 
In recent years the legislator has made great efforts to curb bogus self-
employment by improving enforcement options. The currently stranded 
initiative for the Tax and Customs Administration to introduce a new as-
sessment system (Employment Relationships (Deregulation) Act) described 
earlier is one example of such efforts. 
————————— 
15 Goudswaard en Caminada 2017, p.  
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Another example is the Act Combating Bogus Self-employment that en-
tered into force on 1 January 2016. Bogus self-employment is defined as 
the situation in which a person officially performs work as a self-employed 
person while the facts and circumstances indicate the existence of an em-
ployment contract. The factual situation is different from the situation as it is 
presented (on paper) with the aim of improperly competing on working con-
ditions. The government attach importance to actively combating bogus 
constructions not only because of the adverse consequences for govern-
ment finance but mainly in order to prevent improper competition and peo-
ple being pushed aside in the labour market.16  
The bill for combating bogus constructions proposed an alternative, more 
extensive system to the hirers’ liability set out in Article 7:616a-616f of the 
Dutch Civil Code and has replaced Article 7:692 of the Dutch Civil Code.  
 
The act comprises changes to, for example, the Minimum Wages and Min-
imum Holiday Allowance Act and the Act on Economic Offences and is di-
vided into the following sections:17  
– Chain liability. When there are multiple customers or contractors the 
entire chain is jointly and severally liable for payment of the applicable 
minimum wage and minimum allowance in conformity with the law and 
the collective labour agreement to the employee. 
– Establishing identity. If requested employers have to establish the iden-
tity of the employee within 48 hours and communicate this to the In-
spectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Inspectie 
SZW). 
– Additional requirements relating to the wage slip. Wage slips should be 
itemised and expense allowances may not be set-off against the mini-
mum wage. And the minimum wage should not be paid in cash. 
– Improved disclosure of inspection details and communication regarding 
the failure to comply with the applicable collective labour agreement. 
This improves compliance with the collective labour agreement and en-
forcement. 
For the latest political plans to narrow the social protection gap between the 
self-employed and wage earners see Chapter 4. 
2.2 Marginal employment  
2.2.1 General 
Marginal employment is not so dependent on the number of hours worked 
a week, although in practice this is often less than the number worked un-
————————— 
16 Parliamentary papers II 2014/15, 32108, 2. 
17 Vergouwen, Commentaar op Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 7 art. 692 (Arbeidsrecht thematisch) C.3: Act Combating Bogus 
Constructions. 
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der a regular employment contract. Labour law defines the following flexible 
employment relationships. 18 
Homework relationship 
Under this construction work is performed at home for a company or com-
panies in return for payment. In the absence of a hierarchical relationship 
there is a contract for work or contract for services. The home worker is 
free to structure the work and performs this at his or her own risk. For en-
trepreneurs this construction is attractive because of the flexible deployabil-
ity and the absence of regulations imposed by employment contract law. 
Freelance relationship 
This usually regards incidental work performed under a contract for ser-
vices. Here too the advantage for the customer is the possibility of flexible 
deployment and savings in labour costs. 
Call or on demand contracts 
The substance of such a contract is clear from the title. When the number 
of hours to be worked within specific limits is guaranteed this is called a 
min-max contract. In the absence of this guarantee it is referred to as a 
zero hour contract. The legal qualification of the relationship between the 
two parties can be defined in two ways.  
 
It might be a pre-contract. This contract only regulates the conditions for in 
the event that both parties decide to enter into an employment contract. 
Until that time there is no employment contract. This pre-contract ends au-
tomatically with virtually no job protection.  
 
Another form is the (on-going) employment contract with deferred obligation 
to perform. This is a contract for an indefinite period of time under which the 
employee only performs work when called upon to do so. This is the ‘zero 
hour contract’ and is has the same job protection as regular employment 
contracts.  
Agency contract 
De agency contract is regulated in Article 7:690 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
There are three parties to this contract, the employment agency, the tempo-
rary employee and the hirer. The relationship between hirer and temporary 
employment agency qualifies as a contract for services and is governed by 
regulations under the Posting of Workers by Intermediaries Act (Waadi). No 
contractual relationship is created between the hirer and the agency work-
er. However, the hirer is liable for the agency worker under Article 7:658 of 
the Dutch Civil Code and is treated as the agency worker’s employer for the 
purposes of the Working Conditions Act and the Working Hours Act. After 
having worked for two consecutive years the agency worker counts for the 
application of the Works Councils Act. 
 
————————— 
18 Bakels 2015, par. 3.1.3. 
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Payroll contract 
This is a construction under which the employer contracts out typical em-
ployer obligations to a specialised company. In November 2016 the Su-
preme Court made a major ruling regarding the legal qualification of a pay-
roll contract. According to the Supreme Court payrollers should be treated 
as agency workers. For the existence of an agency contract it is sufficient 
that the employer makes the employee commercially available to third par-
ties. In other words the Supreme Court sees no legal difference between 
the payroll contract and the agency contract.19 
2.2.2 Marginal employment and inclusion in social insurance 
With regard to the above categories it is important that in connection with 
their employment relationship with the employment agency or payroll com-
pany agency workers and payroll workers are insured for the employee 
insurance schemes. When there is an ‘agency clause’ an exceptional situa-
tion arises in the event of illness. Under such a clause the agency contract 
ends immediately if the agency worker falls ill. After the contract has been 
terminated, from the third day of illness there is no longer any entitlement to 
continued payment of wages on grounds of the Sickness Benefits Act. In 
the absence of an agency clause the employment agency has to continue 
to pay wages under the agency contract. An agency clause may be insert-
ed during the first 26 weeks of the agency relationship. On grounds of the 
collective labour agreement this period can be extended to up to 78 worked 
weeks. 
 
For other forms of flexible employment relationships reference should be 
made to the ‘Rarities Decision’.20 As explained in Part 1 of this report, this 
decision regulates the conditions under which the scope of the employee 
insurance schemes is extended to include special groups. Examples of 
these groups are: small contractors for work, intermediaries and their agen-
cies (commercial agents, representatives etc.), share-fishermen, interns, 
conscripts, executives of cooperative societies, homeworkers and their 
agencies, musicians and artists, professional sportsmen and women and 
the remaining group of ‘people performing professional services’. Inasmuch 
as flexible workers qualify themselves as one of these groups and meet the 
set requirements, they are included in the insurance.  
 
The most colourful group of people to whom the scope of the employee 
insurance schemes is extended is that of people performing professional 
services. Whether or not a specific profession is part of this group has been 
decided in numerous court cases.21 To qualify for compulsory insurance 
several conditions have to be met. For instance the scope of the work rela-
tionship is subject to certain minimums in terms of the number of working 
hours or duration of the work and earnings (at least 40% of the statutory 
————————— 
19 ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2356   
20 Decision on designating cases in which work relationships are treated as employment 
21 Hogewind-Wolters, Commentaar op Ziektewet art. 5. 
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minimum wage). These conditions are listed in Article 5 ZW, Article 5 WW 
and Article 3 Rarities Decision.  
 
Article 8 of the Rarities Decision contains the following grounds for exclu-
sion: 
 the person works as an independent entrepreneur; 
  the person works from within a one-man business of which he or she 
is director/shareholder for the customer;  
 the person provides personal services for a private individual (e.g. 
nursing, care, childcare, household work etc.);  
 the person performs work of a spiritual nature (religious nature) or;  
 the employment relationship is dominantly governed by the family re-
lationship (e.g. the relationship between spouses or between parents 
and children or unmarried cohabiting people). 
 
Whether the person is insured against sickness, unemployment and inca-
pacity for work depends on the circumstances of the case. If the person 
falls under one of the exclusions listed in Article 8 of the Rarities Decision, 
he or she has no rights because their status is equivalent to that of a ‘truly’ 
self-employed person.  
 
Article 5a Rarities Decision entered into force in 2009. This article regards 
sex-workers and is intended to reinforce the position of this group. In 2011 
the ‘Designation as employer and exemption from insurance obligation for 
employee insurance schemes’ made exemption from the payment of con-
tributions possible.22 The operator agrees a package of conditions for this 
with the Tax and Customs Administration. Several other conditions also 
have to be met. For instance the sex-worker must be able to refuse work 
and to determine their own work times, be free in choice of clothes provided 
the chosen clothes are customary in the sector, be allowed to refuse to 
drink alcohol and be free to choose their own medical attendant. If one or 
more of the conditions are not met in the relationship with the sex-worker, 
the exemption does not apply.23  
The national insurance schemes based on residency obviously also apply 
to people performing marginal work. These are child-related schemes, the 
old age pension payable under the AOW and the surviving dependents 
scheme under the Anw.  
 
Supplementary pension schemes are reserved for employees or those 
treated as an employee. In general it can be said that the pension agree-
ments apply a stricter definition of ‘employment’ than is the case for the 
public employee insurance schemes. The excluded cases are, just like the 
solo self-employed workers pushed to the side-line. If they want to build up 
supplementary income for their old age, they have to arrange this them-
selves on the private pensions market. 
————————— 
22 Damsteegt, Flexibele arbeidsrelaties C.101.4.9. 
23 CRvB 26 April 2013, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2013:CA0316 
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2.2.3 Any important reforms within the last few years?  
In the legislative field there is the implementation of the Act on Work and 
Security (WWZ) in July 2015. This act aims, among other things, to make 
the systems of flexible labour law, dismissal law and labour law more acti-
vating and to reduce the growing divide between people with a permanent 
and a flexible contract. The increased need for flexibility of employers has, 
since the implementation of the Act on Flexibility and Security in 1999, 
mainly resulted in a growing number of people working long term on the 
basis of a flexible contract. Some of these people in the ‘flexible shell’ run 
the risk of becoming removed from the labour market. For instance be-
cause they have less perspective of a long term employment relationship 
and less is invested in their education and thus perspectives for the future. 
Because people in the flexible shell are more often unemployed than peo-
ple with a permanent job, the cost of flexible employment is partly passed 
on to society.24 The chain regulation in Article 7:668a of the Dutch Civil 
Code is, amongst other arrangements, intended to prevent employers from 
being able to keep workers endlessly in a flexible employment relationship. 
The chain regulation limits the maximum number of temporary contracts 
that can be entered into consecutively and the maximum duration of these. 
On 1 July 2015 the maximum contract duration imposed by the chain regu-
lation was changed to 24 months. The maximum number of consecutive 
contracts that can be entered into is still three.  
The coalition agreement of the current Rutte III government of October 
2017 has announced a series of new measures aimed to reduce the rift in 
the labour market between employees with a permanent employment rela-
tionship and other workers. As part of the proposals the period during which 
the chain regulation applies in which temporary contracts can be offered 
will be increased again to three years. This is to make sure that employers 
are less quick to discard temporary employees. It is hard to explain this 
policy fickleness to foreigners but Dutch people take it for granted. Fur-
thermore, the coalition agreement also announces the intention to restrict 
the payrolling options. For more about this see Chapter 4.  
2.3 Second or multiple jobs  
Combining multiple jobs is relatively common in the Netherlands. In Europe 
the Netherlands occupies fifth place in this respect. Multiple jobs are held in 
different structures, most often by holding several jobs in paid employment. 
The hybrid variant is a permanent job combined with self-employment. Be-
cause the Netherlands has a high percentage of part timers,25 there is also 
more opportunity for people to have multiple jobs. Research has found that 
the phenomenon has increased significantly in recent years, certainly when 
compared to the rest of Europe.26 
————————— 
24 Parliamentary papers II 2014/15, 33818, 3. 
25 48% in the Netherlands compared to an average of 18% in Europe as a whole. 
26 Dorenbosch, Changing face of ‘multi-jobbing’ 
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One in every five Dutch people say they have multiple jobs because of 
these reasons, this is more frequent amongst less educated people. Others 
combine multiple forms of work because of the variation or as a way of de-
veloping themselves.  
 
The general assumption that people combine jobs to make ends meet ap-
pears to be only partly true. About one in five multi-jobbers state financial 
necessity as a reason for having multiple jobs.27 Other incentives are earn-
ing a little extra, variation in work, personal development or work security.28  
 
Although there is not yet much known about the advantages and disad-
vantages of multi-jobbing, up to now the effect seem to be mainly positive.  
 
According to TNO researchers Sanders there are hardly any tax problems. 
‘It appears as if you have less left over because you can only apply the tax-
free allowance to one job. But this allowance is deducted from the wage 
you earn in your main job, so on balance you have as much left over as you 
would if you worked the hours in one job. However, people working under a 
hybrid structure don’t build up pension on their earnings in solo self-
employment. They have to make their own arrangements for this, just like 
incapacity for work. But that’s just part of being self-employed.’29 
 
In the hybrid variant of multi-jobbing in which the person combines em-
ployment for a wage with self-employment some reliance on the employee 
insurance schemes is possible. For the self-employed part they are exclud-
ed from these advantages and neither do they build up a pension. In prac-
tice it is hard to meet the hour criteria applied by the Tax and Customs Ad-
ministration, a working week has, in principle, a limited number of hours. 
How this works in practice and how people deal with this is not known. At 
the time of writing no research has as yet been published on this subject. 
However, research has shown that people with multiple jobs generally work 
fewer hours a week than people with one job. On the other hand, in the 
hybrid variant more hours are worked.30 
 
From the point of view of labour law there are a number of snags to com-
bining multiple jobs. First of all the legislation and regulations on working 
hours must be complied with. The applicable collective labour agreement 
might also contain restrictions or restrictions might be directly imposed by 
the employment contract. In addition, under Article 7:611 of the Dutch Civil 
Code the employee is required to act as a good employee. They should 
take into account the employer’s reputation and competitive position and 
the additional workload that accompanies multi-jobbing should not put their 
health at risk. No uniform trend can be defined in the case law, but rulings 




28 Dorenbosch et al, Multi-jobbing als employability-strategie, TvA > Episode 2 2015. 
29 http://www.ser.nl/nl/publicaties/ser/2013/november2013/multi-jobben.aspx 
30 Dorenbosch et al, Multi-jobbing als employability-strategie, TvA > Episode 2 2015. 
31 De Wolff, Het stapelen van banen arbeidsrechtelijk beschouwd, ArbeidsRecht 2014/42. 
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Because research into this form of employment relationship is still in its 
infancy, not much can be said about the implications for social security. 
In October 2015 the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
(SZW) requested the Social and Economic Council (SER) to conduct re-
search into the phenomenon of multi-jobbing and hybrid entrepreneur-
ship.32 At the time of writing the results have not yet been published. 
2.3.1 Other employment structures 
Digitisation has given rise to other ways of working and other forms of work. 
It is no longer necessary to be at a fixed place at a fixed time to do your 
work. In the Netherlands this is referred to as the New Way of Working.33 
As a result of this the Working Hours (Adjustment) Act has been replaced 
by the Flexible Working Act. Under this employees may submit a request to 
their employer to adjust the working times and workplace as well as the 
working hours. Employers are required to heed this request when the work 
allows this.  
The rise of the sharing economy where goods and services are traded 
through digital platforms is a more recent phenomenon. Examples include 
Uber, Werkspot and Thuisbezorgd. These suppliers make it possible to 
bring together supply and demand in an efficient way. The success of Wik-
ipedia is proof that this can also work well on a voluntary basis.34  
When digital work is offered on a digital platform, this is crowd work. What 
would otherwise have been a full time job, is split into micro tasks for micro 
payment. The performance takes place in lost hours by an anonymous and 
indefinite crowd.35 Research shows that 12% of the Dutch people have 
done crowd work at one time or another.  
 
Due to the increase in this form of employment more attention is being paid 
to the chances of providing protection under labour law. The European Un-
ion and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are both among those 
having this on their agenda.36  
 
Work on demand is the usual term for that part of the sharing economy in 
which services are provided. Uber (taxi services) and Airbnb (accommoda-
tion in private homes) are successful examples of this. However, the social 
effects are controversial, as a result of which a need for more regulation 
can be expected.37 According to the Scientific Council for Government Poli-
cy (WRR) public authorities could impose specific requirements on behalf 
of the users of platforms with regard to transparency in the area of algo-
rithmic selection principles, data flows, earning models and governance.38 
————————— 
32 https://www.ser.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/2010-2019/2015/20150910-combinatiebanen.aspx. 
33 R. Knegt e.a., ‘Het Nieuwe Werken’ en de arbeidsrechtelijke regelgeving, Amsterdam: HSI March 2011, commissioned by SZW. 
34 Wikipedia is an internet encyclopaedia, which is written by a large number of authors worldwide. It must be possible to check the 
content and third parties may not be wronged but otherwise the principle of open content applies. 
35 Houwerzijl, Arbeid en arbeidsrecht in de digitale platformsamenleving: een verkenning, TRA 2017/14. 
36 Notice from the Commission, A European agenda for the sharing economy, Brussels 2016: COM (2016) 356, p. 12-15. 
37 Sandee, Wetgever heeft meerdere opties voor deeleconomie, SCA, 2017/13 
38 Van Dijck e.a. 2016, p. 146. 
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The reason for doing so would be to make sure that the new sharing econ-
omy does not become a new way of competing on working conditions. As 
yet there is little decisive case law in the Netherlands on the employment 
implications of working in the sharing economy. 
 
2.4.3 Zero hours contract 
Addressed in section 2.2.1 flexible employment relationships  
 
2.4.4 Bogus self-employment 
Addressed in section 2.1.7 Act Combating bogus self-employment 
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3 Labour law 
Self-employed workers are, in principle, not protected under labour law. For 
instance dismissal prohibitions do not apply to self-employed workers and 
self-employed workers are not entitled to a minimum wage, paid holidays or 
continued payment of wages during illness. Neither do self-employed work-
ers have any incapacity for work or health insurance and/or supplementary 
pension entitlements. On the other hand self-employed workers are eligible 
for various tax facilities for entrepreneurs, like the self-employed person’s 
deduction, the starter’s deduction and the profit exemption for small and 
medium-sized enterprises. In the Netherlands these facilities are partly be-
hind the increase in the number of solo self-employed workers.  
 
While in social reality we also see hybrid forms. People who have the sta-
tus of self-employment but the same dependencies as employees. These 
people often still have some sort of social protection. The clearest example 
of this is fictional employment, in respect of which the personal scope of 
application of the social insurance schemes is extended to include workers 
who strictly speaking do not have an employment contract. Also the Mini-
mum Wage Act is a good example of such an extension. We will look at it in 
more detail below. 
 
3.1 Extension of minimum wage protection 
The Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Decision extends the 
scope of application of the Minimum Wage Act (WML). Although this exten-
sion primarily aims to protect homeworkers, the scope of the Decision is 
generally formulated. The explanatory note to the Decision says there are 
no grounds to ‘treat groups of employees who are factually and socially in 
the same position differently simply because of the fact that in some cases 
the usual criteria for the existence of an employment contract are not met 
(...)’.39 In other words, other workers who meet the conditions laid down by 
the Decision can also qualify for the statutory minimum wage. Including 
self-employed workers. However people working in a profession or who 
have their own company are explicitly excluded from the personal scope of 
Article 2 WML. This could explain why so many self-employed workers do 
not fall within the scope of the Decision, since these people often have their 
own company or provide professional services.40  
 
On 28 March 2017 the bill on ‘Amendments to the Act on Minimum Wage 
and Minimum Holiday Allowance in connection with a declaration that the 
act applies to further specified contracts for services’ (the Amendment) was 
adopted by the First Chamber of the Dutch parliament.41 This amendment 
————————— 
39
 Stb. 1996, 481. 
40
 Houweling 2017, p. 466-467. 
41
 Actions I 2016/17, 22, item 6. 
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extends the scope of the second paragraph of Article 2 WML. Consequent-
ly the statutory minimum wage will also apply for people who perform work 
for payment on the basis of a contract for services, unless they perform the 
work as a self-employed professional or as part of the activities pursued by 
their own company. In other words, some self-employed workers fall within 
the scope of application of the WML, provided they meet the conditions. 
This amendment aims to combat improper use of the contract for services. 
This is the case if the contract has been drawn up with the obvious purpose 
of preventing the contractor from qualifying for the statutory minimum wage 
and the statutory minimum holiday allowance, for example, by not obliging 
the contractor to perform the work personally while in practice this is the 
case.42 
 
It is important to understand that the extension to include employment rela-
tionships other than those based on an employment contract has its limits. 
Both regarding the fictitious employment relationship and the Minimum 
Wage Act. More specifically, these extensions do not apply for people per-
forming work as self-employed professionals or as part of the activities pur-
sued by their own company. An assessment of whether this is the case is 
based on the definition of entrepreneur applied by the Tax and Customs 
Administration.43 An entrepreneur is someone who runs a sustainable or-
ganisation of capital and work, which focuses on making profits.44 The SZW 
inspectorate has to establish whether work is performed as a company or 
profession. In this assessment all the facts and circumstances that have to 
be considered in conjunction with each other are important.45 For example, 
the degree of independence when performing the work, working for own 
account or risk and a specific volume of work.46  
 
Conclusion: inasmuch as self-employed workers do qualify as entrepre-
neurs, they are not protected by labour law and excluded from the employ-
ee insurance schemes. People who neither meet this definition of entrepre-
neur nor have an employment contract form a hybrid category that general-
ly falls under the scope of some parts of labour law (for instance the Act on 
Minimum Wage) and the employee insurance schemes. 
3.2 Collective bargaining 
Article 1 (2) of the Act on Collective Labour Agreements makes it possible 
to declare the applicability of a collective labour agreement to a contract for 
services and contract for work. Under this article parties to the collective 
labour agreement can include provisions on minimum rates for self-
employed workers in the collective labour agreement. Parties to a collective 
labour agreement might have an interest in declaring the applicability of the 
————————— 
42
 Parliamentary papers II 2016/17, 33623, 3, p. 2 (Explanatory Memorandum ). 
43
 Parliamentary papers II 2016/17, 33623, 3, p. 2 (Explanatory Memorandum ). 
44
 Parliamentary papers II 2016/17, 33623, 6, p. 13 (Explanatory Memorandum ). 
45
 HR 14 February 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:283, TRA 2014/48, m.nt. L van den Berg. 
46
 Parliamentary papers II 2016/17, 33623, 6, p. 13. 
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collective labour agreement to contracts for services and contracts for work 
when employees and self-employed workers perform the same activities in 
a sector or company. This would be to avoid price competition on labour.  
 
Only a few collective labour agreements actually take advantage of the 
possibility offered by Article 1 (2) of the Act on Collective Labour Agree-
ments. One of these is the collective labour agreement for remplaçanten 
(replacements) concluded between FNV Kunst Informatie and Media (FNV 
Kiem) and Nederlandse Toonkunstenaarsbond on the one hand and on the 
other the Vereniging van Stichtingen Remplaçanten Nederlandse Orkesten. 
Article 5 of the articles of association of FNV Kiem reads as follows: ‘Mem-
bers of the union may only be natural persons who assent to the rationale 
and purpose of the union, endorse the contents of these articles of associa-
tion and: a. perform work either independently or in paid employment (...)’ 
In other words FNV Kiem is authorised by its articles of association to con-
clude collective labour agreements for self-employed workers. FNV Kiem 
has also concluded the collective labour agreement for remplaçanten for 
and at the risk of self-employed remplaçanten (replacements) performing 
work under a contract for services. Annex 5 to this collective labour agree-
ment sets out that self-employed remplaçanten must be paid a bonus of 
16% on their wages. This provision has been included because the parties 
to the collective labour agreement are seeking to protect employees 
against unfair wage competition and because self-employed remplaçanten 
are not protected against the risks connected to the work. There was an 
expectation that by using minimum wage rates for self-employed workers, 
employees will be replaced less quickly by these self-employed workers.47 
 
The collective labour agreement for architects also contains a provision for 
self-employed workers. This collective labour agreement has been 
concluded between the Koninklijke Maatschappij tot Bevordering der 
Bouwkunst Bond van Nederlandse Architectenbureaus (BNA) and CNV 
Dienstenbond. The introduction to this collective labour agreement states 
that the self-employed workers are not directly, but indirectly, party to the 
collective labour agreement. In other words the collective labour agreement 
is not concluded each time for and for the account of self-employed work-
ers but only for employees. In Section II a of the collective labour agree-
ment the parties to the agreement have included instructions for the con-
tract for services. They have done so in an effort to create an equal playing 
field for all workers. Unfair competition takes place between the self-
employed workers and employees because they often perform similar work 
but do not enjoy the same protection under labour law. Article 7 of the col-
lective labour agreement for architects requires architect agencies to pay 
‘self-employed professionals’ minimum rates. However, with the exception 
of Section II a, including Article 7, the collective labour agreement has been 
declared generally binding.48 Because the minimum rate provision has not 
been declared generally binding, parties to the collective labour agreement 
————————— 
47
 Boonstra, Arbeidsrecht 2016/43. 
48
 Dutch Government Gazette 2016, 42260. 
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have decided that the minimum rates are not compulsory for BNA mem-
bers.49 The plan to create an equal playing field for all workers with the min-
imum rate provision was for this reason unsuccessful. Section II a has been 
exempted from the generally binding declaration because a minimum rate 
provision for self-employed workers conflicts with competition law.  
 
The extension of the scope of the collective labour agreement for remplan-
centen to include self-employed workers has also prompted activity in the 
field of competition law. The collective labour agreement gave reason for 
the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) to publish a vision paper in which 
the Nma announced that the inclusion of minimum rate provisions for self-
employed workers in collective labour agreements is contrary to competi-
tion law.50 After all, the majority of self-employed workers are entrepre-
neurs.51 Following the publication of the vision paper the collective labour 
agreement was cancelled by the parties to the agreement. FNV Kiem con-
sequently went to court requesting, among other things, a court ruling that 
competition law does not preclude a provision in a collective labour agree-
ment requiring the employer to pay specific self-employed workers mini-
mum rates. The main issue disputed in the case FNV Kiem/the Netherlands 
is whether a collective labour agreement provision requiring customers to 
pay minimum rates to self-employed workers falls under the collective la-
bour agreement exemption. In its ruling on 4 December 2014 the ECJ es-
tablished that the service providers like the remplaçanten, might perform 
the same work as employees, but that they are, in principle, companies as 
referred to in Article 101 (1) VWEU.52 From this it follows that collective 
labour agreement arrangements that impose a compulsory rate on custom-
ers are contrary to competition law. Only if the service providers are in fact 
bogus self-employed workers, in other words, service providers whose sit-
uation is comparable to that of employees, does a different situation apply. 
Taking the above into account it can be concluded that it is not possible to 
apply collective labour agreements to self-employed workers, at least in-
asmuch as they cannot be defined as bogus self-employed workers as re-




 http://www.sfa-architecten.nl/cao/cao/cao-2015-2017.html  
50
 NMa 2007. 
51
 NMa 2007. 
52
 ECJ 4 December 2014, C-413/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, TRA 2015/20, m.nt. E.F. 
Grosheide (FNV Kiem/Nederland). 
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4  Evaluation 
From this study it follows that in the Netherlands there is a  distinction be-
tween wage earners with an employment contract on the one hand and 
self-employed workers with fiscal entrepreneur status on the other. The 
latter group is excluded from the protection of most of the corpus of labour 
law and of employee insurance schemes for sickness, unemployment and 
incapacity for work. Neither are they likely to be covered by collective sec-
ond pillar pensions.  
 
Between these two groups of wage earners and entrepreneurs there are 
special categories without an employment contract who enjoy limited job 
and social security protection. These are diverse groups like artists, fran-
chise holders, sales agents, homeworkers, etc. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, over the last decades the Netherlands 
has experienced a sharp increase in both solo self-employment and flexible 
employment. There are many factors which explain this trend. These in-
clude: the liberal registration policy of self-employment by the Dutch Tax 
and Customs Administration prior to 2016, generous fiscal exemptions for 
the self-employed, and previous labour law reforms which regulated (and in 
doing so: facilitated) flexible employment relationships. 
 
The growth of solo self-employment is increasingly seen as problematic. In 
some sectors, like the building industry, garden services, post, cleaning and 
home care there is evidence of crowding out of traditional wage labour. 
Sometimes this trend is visible for the general public through incidents. 
Thus, for example, in 2013 the health care organisation Sensire sacked 
1100 of its employees and subsequently offered them the possibility to be 
hired as self-employed workers in a newly created limited company. After a 
long struggle, the employees stopped Sensire from doing this and they 
were taken on board as employees again. But in many cases, the process 
of replacement of wage earners by solo self-employment continues incre-
mentally in a less visible manner without hitting the headlines. As men-
tioned in Chapter 1 of this report, the increase in the number of Dutch em-
ployees with a flexible work relationship and solo self-employment has co-
incided with a drop in the number of permanent jobs to 62% (73% in 2004). 
  
Solo self-employment is seen as a problem for workers when the registra-
tion of the employment relationship is not correct or bogus (schijnzelfstan-
digheid) or when the self-employed are highly dependent upon a small 
number of customers (afhankelijke zelfstandigheid). The problem of de-
pendent self-employment is most manifest in relation to lower paid work, 
because the workers lack the negotiating position to keep up a decent in-
come. Bogus self-employment is rejected in full because it does not only 
impact negatively upon the protection of the lower paid workers but also 
because it corrupts the foundation of tax and contribution liability.  
 
Stakeholders, advisory bodies and independent academics have put for-
ward various proposals to address the lack of social protection for inde-
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pendent and flexible workers. These range from a differentiated system of 
social security protection for all workers (Klosse 2017), an extension of the 
fictitious labour relationship in the employee insurance schemes to entre-
preneurs (Ambtelijk Rapport 2017) to the introduction of a completely new 
labour code which regulates various categories of labour in a coherent 
manner (Houweling 2017). 
 
Until recently, the government response has mostly been limited to two 
things: 1) offering more legal certainty by introducing binding registration at 
the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration and 2) combating bogus self-
employment by simplifying legislation and strengthening enforcement 
measures.  
 
In our view, paradoxically and despite all it mishaps and teething problems 
the binding registration may qualify as an interesting best practice from a 
comparative point of view. This is because the registration system does not 
only provide legal certainty, but can also operate as a steering instrument 
to regulate employment relationships in a pro-active manner according to 
policy objectives pursued. Thus, for example, when the feeling is that solo 
self-employment should be tested more vigorously in relation to the tradi-
tional criteria of the employment contract, this can be done by changing 
how authorities judge the labour relationship as part of the registration sys-
tem. While the previously existing system of the VAR-verklaring failed to 
realise this ambition because it was too liberal and shifted the burden of 
wrongful registration too much to the worker, the new system of so called 
model agreements (which seeks to address these wrongs) failed because 
of implementation problems (infra 2.1.1). But this does not mean to say that 
the system cannot work. Arguably, the new approach should be given time 
and space to be tried out. For this reason, we support the resolution adopt-
ed in the coalition agreement of the new government of Rutte III issued in 
October 2017 to seek a new solution in the form of a ‘commissioners’ 
statement’ to be obtained from the tax authorities, even though concrete 
details of the new plan have not yet seen the day light. 
 
A second new measure, also included in the coalition agreement of the 
Rutte III government, is also interesting from an international point of view 
because of its relatively simple but at the same time radical character. In-
dependent workers who earn less than 125% of the minimum wage defined 
in the statute or a collective labour agreement (less than between € 15 and 
€ 18 per hour) will be deemed to have an employment contract. The dura-
tion of the employment should be longer than three months. The high earn-
ing entrepreneurs on the other hand will be given an ‘opt out’ of tax and 
contribution liability (when they earn more than € 75 euro per hour) for con-
tracts that last less than one year.  
 
The proposals of the latest government are also supposed to solve the 
problem of a lack of social security protection for non-wage earners. Low 
paid solo self-employed workers will simply be treated as having an em-
ployment contract. A flipside of the coin is that there is no longer any pro-
spect for the re-emergence of the general universal scheme for incapacity 
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for work which existed until 1998 (and further in revised form until 2004). 
This is perhaps the third lesson that can be learned from the Dutch experi-
ence: be careful when abolishing broad solidarity institutions, because once 
abolished they are very hard to re-introduce. 
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